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Abstract
Using the standard neoclassical growth model with two types of agents, we
examine how the presence of heterogenous agents aﬀects the stabilization role
of progressive income taxation. We ﬁrst show that if the marginal tax payment
of each agent increases with her relative income, the steady state satisﬁes local
saddlepoint stability so that the equilibrium is determinate. However, unlike
the representative agent models with progressive taxation, our model with het-
erogeneous agents may have the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy. The
indeterminacy conditions depend not only on the property of tax functions but
also on production and preference structures.
Keywords: heterogeneous agents, progressive taxation, wealth distribution, ag-
gregate stability
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It has been widely acknowledged that progressive income taxation under the balanced-
budget rule is one of the most eﬀective tools for establishing macroeconomic stability.
In fact, Guo and Lansing (1998) demonstrate that progressive income taxation may
eliminate sunspot-driven economic ﬂuctuations caused by equilibrium indeterminacy
even in the presence of strong degree of external increasing returns.1 Guo and Har-
rison (2004) also claim that equilibrium indeterminacy in a model with regressive
income taxation under a ﬁxed government spending shown by Schmitt-Groh´ e and
Uribe (1997) does not hold if the government spending is adjusted to keep a ﬁxed
level of income tax.
Although those ﬁndings are intuitively plausible, they are obtained in the context
of representative agent models. The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the stabi-
lization eﬀect of progressive income taxation in a model with heterogeneous agents.
For analytical clarity, we use a simple neoclassical growth model with ﬁxed labor
supply in which there are only two types of agents. Each group consists of inﬁnitely-
lived agents who have an identical time discount rate. Each group of agents, however,
may have diﬀerent utility functions and hold diﬀerent level of initial wealth. Our
main concern is to investigate how the presence of heterogeneous agents aﬀects the
stabilization eﬀect of progressive income taxation under the balanced-budget disci-
pline. We ﬁrst examine the case in which the same rate of tax applies to both labor
and capital incomes. Following Guo and Lansing (1998), we assume that the rate of
tax is assumed to increase with the private income relative to the average income in
the economy at large. We then consider the model with factor speciﬁc income tax-
ation: diﬀerent rates of tax apply to labor and capital incomes, respectively. Given
each taxation scheme, we characterize the steady state equilibrium and explore its
local stability.
We obtain three main results. First, if the marginal rate of tax is a monotonic
function of the relative income, the economy has a unique steady state equilibrium
where all the agents hold an identical amount of capital. Second, if the marginal
tax payment of each agent increases with her relative income, then the steady state
1See also Guo (1999) and Dormel and Pintus (2007).
2satisﬁes local saddlepoint stability so that the equilibrium is determinate. Third, if
the marginal tax payment decreases with the relative income, then the steady state
equilibrium is either unstable or locally indeterminate. In the latter, there may exist
a continuum of converging paths around the steady state. It is also shown that
indeterminacy of equilibrium tends to emerge when the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption of each types of agents is suﬃciently diﬀerent from each
other.
The present study is closely related to some of the existing investigations on
wealth distribution in the neoclassical growth model with heterogenous agents and
non-linear income taxation. Sarte (1997) ﬁrst demonstrates that introducing pro-
gressive income taxation may yield a unique interior steady state even though every
agent’s time discount rate is diﬀerent from each other. As is well known, in the stan-
dard neoclassical growth model with heterogenous households, the agent who has
the lowest time discount rate ultimately owns the entire stock of capital: see Becker
(1980),.Chatterjee (1994) and Sorger (2000). The presence of non-linear income tax-
ation avoids yielding such an extreme conclusion.2 Carroll and Young (2007) analyze
stationary wealth distribution under progressive taxation when each agent’s labor
supply is heterogenous. While Sarte (1997) and Carroll and Young (2007) focus on
the wealth distribution in the steady state equilibrium, Sorger (2002) re-examines
Sarte’s model and presents numerical examples of dynamic analysis in which converg-
ing equilibrium path is indeterminate around the steady state. Since Sorger (2002)
assumes that the time discount rate of each agent is not identical, the wealth of each
agent may not be equalized in the steady state equilibrium. Such an asymmetry
in the steady state could be a source of complex behavior of the model economy.
In contrast, we assume that the income tax depends on the relative level of income
and the time discount rate is identical for all agents, so that the steady-state level
of wealth is completely equalized. This assumption enables us to inspect the rela-
tionship between tax functions, preference structure and the dynamic behavior of
the economy near the steady state in the absence of asymmetric wealth distribution.
2Wealth distribution may not degenerate in the steady state in an overlapping generations econ-
omy:as well see Hendiriks (2007).
3Finally, it is to be pointed out that Li and Sarte (2004) consider an endogenous
growth model with heterogenous agents in which the taxation rule is assumed to be
the same as that used in our study. Due to the assumption of Ak technology, the
model economy in Li and Sarte (2004) always stays at the balanced growth path.
Thus equilibrium dynamics out of the steady state is not discussed in their study.3
The next section constructs an analytical framework. Section 3 characterizes the
steady state equilibrium and investigates equilibrium dynamics under the uniform
income tax, while Section 4 discusses the model with factor-speciﬁc taxation. Section
5 presents numerical examples. Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
2 The Base Model
2.1 Households
There are two groups of inﬁnitely-lived agents who have the same time discount rate.
Two types of agent have diﬀerent levels of initial wealth and their utility functions
could be diﬀerent from each other. For simplicity, population in the economy is
assumed to be constant over time so that the number of agents in each group will not
change. The economy is closed and the government does not issue interest bearing
bonds. Thus the stock of capital is the only asset held by the households. The
representative agent in group i (i = 1;2) supplies one unit of labor in each moment




e¡½tui(ci)dt; ½ > 0; i = 1;2; (1)
over an inﬁnite time horizon. The ﬂow budget constraint for each agent is
˙ ki = ˆ riki + ˆ wi ¡ ci + Ti; i = 1;2: (2)
Here, ki is capital stock owned by an agent in group i; ci consumption, ˆ ri after-tax
rate of return to capital, ˆ wi the after-tax real wage rate and Ti expresses a transfer
3Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and Turnovsky (2006 and 2007) study equilibrium dynamics of neoclassical as
well as endogenous growth models with heterogenous agents. They, however, treat models in which
all agents have an identical quasi-homothetic utility function so that wealth distribution does not
aﬀect aggregate dynamics.
4from the government. The initial holding of capital, ki (0); is given. The instan-
taneous utility function of each type of agent, ui (ci); is monotonically increasing,
strictly concave in ci and satisﬁes the Inada conditions.
2.2 Production
The representative ﬁrm produces a single good according to a constant-returns-to-
scale technology given by




where ¯ Y ; ¯ K and N denote the total output, capital and labor, respectively. Using
the homogeneity assumption, in what follows we write the production function in
such a way that
Y = f (K);
where Y ´ ¯ Y =N and K ´ ¯ K=N: The productivity function, f (K); is assumed
to be monotonically increasing and strictly concave in the capital-labor ratio, K;
and fulﬁlls the Inada conditions. The commodity market is competitive so that the
before-tax rate of return to capital and real wage are respectively determined by
r = f0(K); w = f(K) ¡ Kf0(K): (3)
For simplicity, we assume that capital does not depreciate.
If we denote the number of agents in group i by Ni (i = 1;2); then the full-
employment condition for labor and capital are as follows:
N1 + N2 = N;
N1k1 + N2k2 = ¯ K:
Letting µi = Ni=N; we may express the full-employment conditions in the following
manner:
K = µ1k1 + µ2k2; 0 < µi < 1; µ1 + µ2 = 1: (4)
For notational simplicity, we normalize the total population, N; to one. Thus µi
represents the mass of agents of type i as well as the population share of that type.
52.3 Fiscal Rules
The government levies discretionary income taxes and distributes back its tax rev-
enue as a transfer to each agent. In the main part of the paper, we assume that the
same rate of tax applies to both capital and labor incomes. The rate of tax applies





; i = 1;2;
where ¿i is the rate of tax and yi (= rki + wi) denotes the total income of an agent
in group i: Namely, the tax rate applied to each agent depends only on its standing
in the economy.4 The tax function ¿(yi=Y ): <+ ! <+ is continuous, monotonically
increasing, a twice diﬀerentiable function and satisﬁes 0 < ¿(yi=Y ) < 1:




yi; the average rate of

















Note that the ratio of marginal and average tax payments expresses the degree of
progressiveness of taxation. When this measure is higher (resp. lower) than one,
taxation is progressive (resp. regressive). In our formulation, progressiveness of









implying that taxation is progressive. Since the marginal tax payment depends on

















If the above has a positive value, the marginal tax payment increases with the relative
income. In contrast, if T0
m (yi=Y ) < 0 (so ¿00 (yi=Y ) < 0), then the marginal tax
payment decreases with the relative income. In what follows, we see that the sign of
(6) may play a pivotal role in determining macroeconomic stability of the economy.
4This formulation is used by Guo and Lansing (1998) and Li and Sarte (2004).














w; i = 1;2:







yi ¡ ci + Ti; i = 1;2:
We assume that the government follows the balanced-budget rule and, therefore, its
ﬂow budget constraint (in per-capita term) is









In addition, if we assume that the government pays back an identical amount of
transfer to each agent, the lump-sum transfers of the group 1 and the group 2 are
given by









2.4 Consumption and Capital Formation








(rki + w) ¡ ci + Ti; i = 1;2; (10)
where Ti is determined by (9): Following Guo and Lansing (1998), we assume that
the households perceive the rule of progressive taxation on private income, but she
takes the transfer payment, Ti, as given. Therefore, taking anticipated sequences of
fr(t);w(t);Y (t);Ti (t)g
1
t=0 and the initial holding of capital, ki (0); as given, the
household of type i maximizes (1) subject to (10).
Using the optimization conditions and (3), we ﬁnd that the optimal consumption


















; i = 1;2; (11)
where ¾i (ci) = ¡u00
i (ci)ci=u0
i(ci)(> 0). The optimal level of consumption should also
fulﬁll the transversality condition
lim
t!1
qi(t)ki(t)e¡½t = 0; i = 1;2: (12)
















Summing up the ﬂow budget constraint (10) over all of the households and dividing
the both sides by N, we obtain
µ1˙ k1 + µ2˙ k2 = µ1y1 + µ2y2 ¡ µ1c1 ¡ µ2c2:
Thus, in view of yi = rki + w and (4); we obtain the ﬁnal-good market equilibrium
condition for the entire economy:
˙ K = f (K) ¡ C; (14)
where C = µ1c1 + µ2c2.
3 Macroeconomic Stability
3.1 Dynamic System
From (3) we obtain:
yi = rki + w = f(K) + (ki ¡ K)f0(K):






; i = 1;2; (15)
where K = µ1k1 + (1 ¡ µ1)k2: Substituting (15) into (11) and (13); we obtain a
complete dynamic system with respect to (k1;k2;c1;c2): The solution of this dy-
namic system that fulﬁlls the initial conditions on k1 (0) and k2 (0) as well as the
transversality conditions (12) presents the perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium
of our model economy.
3.2 Steady-State Equilibrium
In the steady-state equilibrium, ki and ci (i = 1;2) stay constant over time. From






































; i;j = 1;2; (17)
where c¤
i and k¤
i denote steady-state levels of ki and ci:










(i = 1;2) is a monotonic function of the relative
income, yi=Y:
Since the derivative of the above function with respect to yi=Y is 2¿0 (yi=Y ) +
(yi=Y )¿00 (yi=Y ); from (6) Assumption 1 means that the marginal tax payment,
@2 (¿yi)=@y2
i ; has the same sign for all feasible levels of yi=Y: Given Assumption 1,
it is easy to conﬁrm the following fact:





2 for i = 1 and 2:
































By Assumption 1, the above equation holds if and only if y¤
1 = y¤
2: Thus from (16)





2 = Y ¤ and k¤
1 = k¤
2 = K in the symmetric steady state, so that
the rate of income tax in the steady-state equilibrium is a given constant, ¿ (1): To
make the steady state feasible, from (17) we should assume the following:
Assumption 2. Tax function ¿ (yi=Y ) satisﬁes
1 ¡ ¿(1) ¡ ¿0(1) > 0: (18)
It is also to be noted that the steady-state wealth distribution is uniquely deter-
mined under Assumption 1 even though ½1 6= ½2: As was discussed in Li and Sarte












































9It is easy to see that. given Assumption 1, the above equations present a unique
levels of y¤
1=Y ¤ and y¤
2=Y ¤: Once y¤
i =Y ¤ is given, (17) determines the steady-state




We are now ready to examine the local stability condition of the steady state equilib-
rium deﬁned above. Linear approximation of dynamic system, (11) and (13); around





















0 0 @˙ c1=@k1 @˙ c1=@k2
0 0 @˙ c2=@k1 @˙ c2=@k2
¡1 0 f0(k¤)[1 ¡ µ2(¿(1) + ¿0(1))] µ2f0(k¤)[¿(1) + ¿0(1)]






































































Let us write the characteristic equation of J in such a way that
¸4 ¡ TrJ¸3 + WJ¸2 ¡ ZJ¸ + DetJ = 0; (20)
10where
TrJ = f0(k¤)[2 ¡ ¿(1) ¡ ¿0(1)]; (21a)









[1 ¡ µ1(¿(1) + ¿0(1))]
@˙ c1
@k1
+ [1 ¡ µ2(¿(1) + ¿0(1))]
@˙ c2
@k2













[2¿0(1) + ¿00(1)]: (21d)
Since our dynamic system involves two jumpable variables, c1 and c2, and two pre-
determined variables, k1 and k2; the presence of stable and determinate equilibrium
path requires that the dynamic system exhibits a regular saddlepoint property at
least around the steady state equilibrium. Inspecting the characteristic equation
given above, we ﬁnd one of the main results of this paper:
Proposition 2. Given Assumptions 1 and 2, the steady state satisﬁes local deter-
minacy if 2¿0 (1) + ¿00 (1) > 0:
Proof. Let us denote roots of the characteristic equation by ¸s (s = 1;2;3;4): As-
sumption 2 means that the trace of J; which equals Σ4
s=1¸s; is strictly positive, so
that at least one of the characteristic roots has positive real part. In addition, if





is positive and, hence, the
number of characteristic roots with positive real parts is either two or four. Note





Γ(k¤)[1 ¡ ¿ (1) ¡ ¿0 (1)]2[µ1¾2(c¤) + µ2¾1(c¤)]
¡[µ1¾1(c¤) + µ2¾2(c¤)][2¿0(1) + ¿00(1)]
ª
:
Since 2¿0 (1) + ¿00 (1) > 0 and Γ(k¤) < 0; ZJ has a negative value. Therefore,
remembering that ZJ = ¸1¸2¸3 + ¸2¸3¸4 + ¸3¸4¸1 + ¸4¸1¸2; we see that at least
one root should be negative. Thus there are two stable roots, so that the competitive
equilibrium path converging to the steady state is uniquely determined. ¥
The above result means that if the marginal tax payment of each agent increases
with the individual income, then the economy has a unique converging path towards
11the symmetric steady state equilibrium where wealth is equally distributed to each
agent, regardless of the initial distribution of wealth and form of the utility function
of each type of agents. In this sense, the speciﬁc form of progressive income taxation
assumed in this paper may contribute to establishing income equality in the long
run.
If 2¿0 (1)+¿00 (1) < 0; the dynamic system may not exhibit a regular saddlepoint
property. In this case, from (21d) the determinant of J is negative, and, therefore,
the number of characteristic root with negative real part is either one or three. If
there is only one stable root, the steady state is locally unstable. If matrix J has
three stable roots, there is a continuum of converging paths around the steady state
equilibrium. In this case the economy may ﬂuctuate around the steady state due to
extrinsic uncertainty (sunspots) that aﬀect agents’ expectations formation.
Since at least one of the characteristic root is positive, the equilibrium path is
indeterminate if and only if (20) has three roots with negative real parts. In this
case, we may ﬁrst observe the following fact:
Proposition 3. Suppose that 2¿0 (1)+¿00 (1) < 0: Then if agents in both groups have
an identical utility function, the steady state equilibrium is asymptotically unstable.
Proof. See Appendix A. ¥
Consequently, if 2¿0 (1) + ¿00 (1) < 0; the existence of multiple equilibrium paths
converging to the steady state requires that agents in each group have diﬀerent forms
of utility functions. We ﬁnd that if each type of agent has diﬀerent form of utility
function, it is hard to obtain the analytical expression of suﬃcient conditions for the
presence of three roots with negative real parts. Hence, in Section 5 we investigate
numerical examples to inspect the possibility of equilibrium indeterminacy in the
case of ¾1 (c1) 6= ¾2 (c2):
124 Alternative Fiscal Rules
4.1 Factor-Speciﬁc Taxation
So far, we have assumed that the income tax applies to the total revenue of an indi-
vidual agent. In this section we consider a more general case where the diﬀerent tax
scheme may apply to labor and capital income, respectively. To make the argument
parallel to the previous discussion, we assume that the rate of tax levied on each













w = ¿w (1); i = 1;2;
where ¿i
k and ¿i
w respectively denote the rates of tax on capital and labor income
applied to the i-th agent. Note that the wage income is the same for all agents,
taxation on the wage income is ﬂat.5 As before, the tax function, ¿k (:); is as-
sumed to be monotonically increasing, at least twice diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes,
0 < ¿k (ki=K) < 1:








rki + (1 ¡ ¿w)w ¡ ci + Ti; i = 1;2; (22)
where Ti represents the government transfer in this model. The government collects
the tax revenue by the progressive income tax and returns the lump-sum transfer
that amount to the share of each group. Then, the modiﬁed ﬂow budget constraint
is



















Assuming that the government pay back an identical amount of transfer to each
agent, the lump-sum transfers of each group is



















5This conclusion, of course, will not hold if labor-leisure choice is allowed. The distinction
between capital and labor income taxation would be more crucial in the model with endogenous
labor supply.
13It is easy to see that under the factor-speciﬁc taxation, the Euler equation for





















; i = 1;2; (24)
where ¾i = ¡u00(ci)ci=u0(ci)(> 0): From equations (22) and (23), the dynamic be-
havior of capital stock held by the type i agents is












; i;j = 1;2; i 6= j: (25)
Here, K and yi in (24) and (25) are deﬁned by
K = µ1k1 + µ2k2; µ1 + µ2 = 1;
yi = f(K) + (ki ¡ K)f0(K):
The steady-state conditions under which ˙ ci = ˙ ki = 0 (i = 1;2) are the following:
c¤


































; i = 1;2:
If ¿k (:) function satisﬁes the same property given in Assumption 1, there is a unique,
symmetric steady state where the, k¤
1 = k¤




2 = f (K¤); (26)
½ = f0 (K¤)
£




As before, (27) requires that
1 ¡ ¿k(1) ¡ ¿k
0(1) > 0: (28)
We can inspect local stability of dynamic system consisting of (24) and (25) in





















0 0 @˙ c1=@k1 @˙ c1=@k2
0 0 @˙ c2=@k1 @˙ c2=@k2
¡1 0 f0(k¤)[1 ¡ µ2(¿k(1) + ¿k
0(1))] f0(k¤)µ2[¿k(1) + ¿k
0(1)]
0 ¡1 f0(k¤)µ1[¿k(1) + ¿0

































¾1(c¤)k¤[µ1Π(k¤)(1 ¡ ¿k (1) ¡ ¿0







¾1(c¤)k¤[µ2Π(k¤)(1 ¡ ¿k (1) ¡ ¿0







¾2(c¤)k¤[µ1Π(k¤)(1 ¡ ¿k (1) ¡ ¿0
k (1)) + µ1(2¿0






¾2(c¤)k¤[µ2Π(k¤)(1 ¡ ¿k (1) ¡ ¿0









The characteristic equation of M is given by
¸4 ¡ TrM¸3 + WM¸2 ¡ ZM¸ + DetM = 0;
where
TrM = f0(k¤)[2 ¡ ¿k(1) ¡ ¿k
0(1)];










[1 ¡ µ1(¿k(1) + ¿0(1))]
@˙ c1
@k1


























Π(k¤)[1 ¡ ¿k (1) ¡ ¿0
k (1)]2[¾2(c¤)µ1 + ¾1(c¤)µ2]





It is easy to show that if we replace ¿ (yi=Y ) function with ¿k (ki=K); then Propo-
sition 2 also holds for the case of factor-speciﬁc taxation. First, if 2¿k
0(1)+¿k
00(1) > 0;
there is a unique, symmetric steady state. In addition, (28) and our assumption,
2¿k
0(1) + ¿k
00(1) > 0, means that Tr M > 0; Det M > 0 and ZM < 0: Therefore, as
shown by the proof for Proposition 3, we may claim the following results:
Proposition 4. Under the factor-speciﬁc income taxation, the steady-state equilib-
rium is uniquely given and satisﬁes local determinacy, if the marginal tax payment
from capital income monotonically increases with relative capital holding, ki=K:
154.2 Government Consumption
One of the key assumptions of our discussion is that the tax revenue of the gov-
ernment is equally distributed back to the households as lump-sum transfers. Our
main results may depend on this assumption. To check this, suppose that all the
tax revenue is spent for consumption by the government. If this is the case, the ﬂow









y2 = G; (31)
where G denotes the government consumption of the ﬁnal goods. Since there is no








(rki + w) ¡ ci; i = 1;2;
and the aggregate dynamics of capital is
˙ K = f (K) ¡ C ¡ G:
Here, we again assume that the income tax is levied on capital and labor income
uniformly.






















0 0 @˙ c1=@k1 @˙ c1=@k2
0 0 @˙ c2=@k1 @˙ c2=@k2
¡1 0 f0(k¤)[1 ¡ (¿(1) + ¿0(1))] 0



























Inspecting this system, we ﬁrst ﬁnd that the stability results shown in Proposition
2 and 3 still hold:
Proposition 5. (i) If the government consumes its tax revenue and if the
tax function satisﬁes 2¿0 (1) + ¿00 (1) > 0; then the steady state equilibrium satisﬁes
regular saddle-point stability.
16(ii) If the government consumes its tax revenue and if ¾1 (c¤
1) = ¾2 (c¤
2); then the
steady-state equilibrium satisﬁes saddle-point stability.
Proof. See Appendix B. ¥
When 2¿0 (1) + ¿00 (1) < 0 and ¾1 6= ¾2; the steady-state equilibrium is again
either totally unstable or locally indeterminate. Comparing J with N; we see that
each matrix involves diﬀerent elements for @˙ ki=@kj (i;j = 1;2): This means that
suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium indeterminacy for J and N would be diﬀerent
from each other. Therefore, the introduction of government consumption aﬀects
equilibrium dynamics quantitatively rather than qualitatively.
5 Numerical Examples
In Sections 3.3 and 4.1 we have conﬁrmed that if the marginal tax payments decreases
with the relative income, the steady-state equilibrium is either locally indeterminate
or totally unstable. Unless the two groups of agents have an identical utility function,
it is hard to obtain analytical conditions that determine whether or not the steady
state equilibrium is indeterminate. We thus present clearer conditions for equilibrium
indeterminacy by examining numerical examples. In our examples the instantaneous







; ¾i > 0; i = 1;2 (32)
¯ Y = F( ¯ K;N) = ¯ K®N1¡®; 0 < ® < 1: (33)








b + m(yi=Y )
»; (34)
where
b + m > 0; b» > 0; and (b + »)2 > b(1 + ») + m:
It is to be noted that this functional form satisﬁes all of our assumptions on the tax
function including Assumption 1.6 Given this tax function, the key values evaluated









; 0 < ¿0 < 1; Á < 1:







(b + m)2 > 0;
¿00(1) =
b»fb(» ¡ 1) ¡ m(1 + »)g
(b + m)3 ;
1 ¡ ¿(1) ¡ ¿0(1) =
(b + m)2 ¡ b(1 + ») ¡ m
(b + m)2 > 0:
As for the bench mark case, we set
® = 0:3; b = 0:58; m = 2:2; » = 5:8; ½ = 0:02:
Then the before-tax rate of return to capital, r; is 0:9756 and the rate of the income
tax is 0:3579 so that 1 ¡ ¿(1) ¡ ¿0(1) has a positive value.7 In what follows, we
focus on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption, 1=¾i; as well
as on the population share of each group, µi; in order to explore the possibility
of equilibrium indeterminacy around the steady state. In so doing, we depict the
region of (¾1;¾2) space under alternative values of µ1 in which the characteristic
equation of J has three roots with negative real parts. Figure 1 shows the boundary
between instability and indeterminacy regions for the case that µ1 = 0:5:8 As this
ﬁgure demonstrates, indeterminacy emerges when ¾1 is suﬃciently smaller than ¾2:9
Notice that the ﬁgure focuses on the case that ¾1 < ¾2: Conversely, when ¾1 is
Using this functional form, we obtain
@ (¿ (yi=Y )yi)=@yi
¿ (yi=Y )
= 1 + Á;
2¿
0 (1) + ¿
00 (1) = Á(Á + 1):
Therefore, in this case 2¿
0 (1)+¿
00 (1) cannot have a negative sign, unless income taxation is regres-
sive, i.e. Á < 0: In addition, the above function monotonically increases with yi=Y; it may violates
¿ (yi=Y ) < 1: Function (34) is free from those problems.
7Since we have ignore capital depreciation, the before tax rate of return to capital in the steady
state has a rather high value.
8To depict the graphs in Figure 1, we change ¾i from 0:1 to 5:0 with an intervals of 0.05.
9Additionally, if we raise ® from 0.3 to a higher value such as 0.8, then indeterminacy tends to
disappear.
18suﬃciently higher than ¾2; we also ﬁnd the combinations of ¾1 and ¾2 under which
local indeterminacy holds around the steady state.
Panel (a) in Figure 2 depicts the same graph as that of Figure 1 for alternative
levels of µ1: Inspecting these graphs, we may infer that the indeterminacy region
ﬁrst expands as µ1 rises, and then it shrinks as µ1 increases further. Panel (b) in
Figure 1 conﬁrms this intuition. Fixing ¾2 at 4:0; this ﬁgure depicts the relation
between µ1 and the upper bounds of ¾1 under which indeterminacy emerges. The
graph indicates that the mass of one type of agent should not dominate the other to
yield equilibrium indeterminacy. In fact, when µ1 is close to either 0 or 1:0; then the
economy resembles to the one with representative agent. The representative-agent
economy with our taxation scheme will not exhibit multiple converging paths. In
fact, if two groups are identical, the tax rate is always ﬁxed at ¿ (1) even out of
the steady state and the government budget satisﬁes T = ¿Y: Thus the aggregate





1 ¡ ¿ (1) ¡ ¿0 (1)
¢
f0 (K) ¡ ½
¤
;
˙ K = f (K) ¡ C;
so that the regular saddlepoint stability is guaranteed for all ¿ (1) 2 [0;1): Our nu-
merical examples, therefore, mean that suﬃcient degree of heterogeneity is needed to
hold indeterminacy. Since in our setting each agent holds an identical level of wealth
at the steady state, the presence of equilibrium indeterminacy requires that there
exists a large degree of heterogeneity of preferences. This fact suggests that if each
type of agent has diﬀerent time discount rate so that inequality of wealth distribu-
tion remains in the steady state (so that we have additional heterogeneity), then the
diﬀerence in preference structure between two groups necessary for indeterminacy
would be mitigated.



















b0 + m0 (µi)
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19Using those tax functions, we conduct numerical experiments to obtain the graphs
displayed in Figures 3 (a) and (b). As these ﬁgures show, the results are similar to the
case of uniform taxation: indeterminacy tends to emerge when ¾2 is suﬃciently larger
than ¾1 (or ¾1 is suﬃciently larger than ¾2): Panel (b), however, shows that the region
of (¾1;¾2) in which indeterminacy holds is smaller than that in the case of uniform
tax. Therefore, in our model economy, the factor-speciﬁc taxation may reduce the
possibility of expectations-driven economic ﬂuctuations caused by multiplicity of
perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied equilibrium dynamics of a Ramsey economy with heteroge-
nous agents in which income taxation is progressive. We have assumed that the
rate of income tax depends on an individual taxable income relative to the average
income of the economy at large and that the tax payments are equally distributed
back to each agent. In this setting, it is shown that under weak restrictions on the
tax function, the steady-state equilibrium is uniquely given and there exists a unique
converging path at least around the steady state unless the marginal tax payment
of each household diaereses with its relative income. Otherwise, the steady state is
either unstable or locally indeterminate. If the latter holds, there is a continuum
of converging path around the steady state, so that expectations-driven ﬂuctuations
may be present. Using numerical examples, we have conﬁrmed that the presence
of equilibrium indeterminacy requires that the elasticity of intertemporal substitu-
tion in consumption of each type of agent is suﬃciently diﬀerent from each other.
The central message of our study is that the stabilizing power of progressive income
taxation demonstrated in representative-agent models may not be always eﬀective if
there are heterogenous agents with diﬀerent preferences.
The analytical framework of this paper is one of the simplest settings. We have
assumed that there are only two types of agents and each agent supplies a ﬁxed level
of labor. In addition, we have focused on the symmetric steady state equilibrium
in which all the agents hold the identical levels of wealth and income. Among the
possible extensions of our discussion, an argent task is to introduce endogenous
20labor-leisure choice of the households. Such a generalization would be particularly
interesting for comparing uniform taxation with factor-speciﬁc taxation discussed in
Sections 3 and 4, because the factor-speciﬁc taxation may play a more prominent
role when labor supply is ﬂexible.
21Appendices
Appendix A
Letting I be 4£4 unit matrix, the characteristic equitation matrix J is expressed
in the following manner:







¸ 0 ¡ !
¾1 [µΓ∆ ¡ (1 ¡ µ)T] ¡ !
¾1 (1 ¡ µ)[Γ∆ + T]
0 ¸ ¡ !
¾2µ[Γ∆ + T] ¡ !
¾2 [(1 ¡ µ)Γ∆ ¡ µT]
1 0 ¸ ¡ f0[1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ∆)] ¡(1 ¡ µ)f0[1 ¡ ∆]













¾1 [µΓ∆ ¡ (1 ¡ µ)T] ¡ ¸2
+f0[1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ∆)]¸
¡ !
¾1 (1 ¡ µ)[Γ∆ + T]
+(1 ¡ µ)f0[1 ¡ ∆]¸
¡ !
¾2µ[Γ∆ + T] + µf0[1 ¡ ∆]¸
¡ !
¾2 [(1 ¡ µ)Γ∆ ¡ µT]





In the above, we deﬁne:




2 < 0; ∆ = 1 ¡ ¿ (1) ¡ ¿0 (1) > 0;





It is now easy to conﬁrm that, if ¾1 = ¾2 = ¾; then the characteristic equation can
be expressed as
det[I¸ ¡ J] = ¡
³








[(1 ¡ µ)Γ∆ ¡ µT] ¡ ¸2
+f0[1 ¡ µ(1 ¡ ∆)]¸ +
!
¾















Thus the characteristic equation, det[I¸ ¡ J] = 0; is given by the following:
·




1 ¡ ¿ ¡ ¿0¢¸·
¸2 ¡
¡












1 ¡ ¿ (1) ¡ ¿0 (1)
¢
= 0
22has one positive and one negative roots, while both roots of
¸2 +
¡






2¿0 (1) + ¿00 (1)
¢
= 0
have positive real parts under the assumption of 2¿0 (1) + ¿00 (1) < 0: Therefore,
the characteristic equation of J has one negative and three roots with positive real
parts, which means that there is no converging path around the steady state when




The characteristic equation of matrix N is







¸ 0 ¡ !
¾1 [µΓ∆ ¡ (1 ¡ µ)T] ¡ !
¾1 (1 ¡ µ)[Γ∆ + T]
0 ¸ ¡ !
¾2µ[Γ∆ + T] ¡ !
¾2 [(1 ¡ µ)Γ∆ ¡ µT]
1 0 ¸ ¡ f0(k¤)[1 ¡ (¿(1) + ¿0(1))] 0














¾1 [µΓ∆ ¡ (1 ¡ µ)T] ¡ ¸2
+f0[1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ∆)]¸
¡ !




¾2 [(1 ¡ µ)Γ∆ ¡ µT]







where T; Γ; ∆; ! and µ are the same deﬁned in Appendix A. Thus the characteristic
equitation, det[¸I ¡ N] = 0; is given by
·
¸2 ¡ f0(1 ¡ (1 ¡ µ)(1 ¡ ∆))¸ +
!
¾1




¸2 ¡ f0(1 ¡ µ(1 ¡ ∆))¸ +
!
¾2








Applying the same logic used in the proof of Proposition 1, we can conﬁrm that this
equation has two roots with negative real parts if T = 2¿0 (1) + ¿00 (1) > 0:.
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Figure 2(b): uniform taxation (¾2 = 4:0)
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Figure 3(b): factor–speciﬁc taxation (¾2 = 4:0)
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